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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
BUILDING CONTRACTS IN LOUISIANA
The articles governing building contracts in Louisiana are
found under the general title "Of Lease." Article 2673 states that
there are two species of contracts of lease:
(1) the letting out of things,
(2) the letting out of labor or industry.
In Article 2745 we find that
"Labor may be let out in three ways:
(1) Laborers may hire their services to another person.
(2) Carriers and watermen hire out their services for the
conveyance either of persons or of goods and merchan-
dise.
(3) Workmen hire out their labor or industry to make
buildings or other works."
Thus we are directed to Section 3 of Chapter 3 of the general
title "Of Lease," The section heading reads "Of Constructing
Buildings According to Plots, and Other Works by the Job, and
ef Furnishing Materials."
Article 2756 states that
"To build by a plot, or to work by the job, is to undertake a
building or a work for a certain stipulated price."
This article is introductory and indicates the broad field to which
the article on Section 3 may well apply. Article 2771 amplifies
Article 2756 by stating that
"Masons, carpenters, blacksmiths and all other artificers, who
undertake work by the job, are bound by the provisions con-
tained in the present section, for they may be considered as
undertakers each in his particular line of business." (Italics
supplied.)
The scope of the section is further broadened and clarified by
Article 2757 which states
"A person, who undertakes to make a work, may agree, either
to furnish his work and industry alone, or to furnish also the
materials necessary for such a work."
Although the articles in this section have been applied almost
exclusively to what is commonly known as building contracts, it
takes only a little imagination to realize the breadth of its pos-
sible scope. Theoretically the articles in this section affect every-
one who undertakes a job for a certain, specified price from the
rug cleaner up through the architect of the state capitol building.
The question of the applicability of the articles in this section
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has arisen in several cases where, because of the verbal and in-
definite nature of the contract, it was uncertain as to whether the
contract was one of sale or a building contract. The question first
arose in Hunt v. Suares, where the plaintiff was to furnish and
install marble mantelpieces in the defendant's house. During the
installation, defendant's home burned, destroying the mantel-
pieces. Plaintiff claimed that the contract was one of sale, that
ownership passed to defendant upon delivery, and that he was
therefore entitled to the purchase price. Defendant contended
that the plaintiff was undertaking a job for a certain specified
price, furnishing his own materials, and that Article 2758 places
the risk of loss on the plaintiff until completion of the work. The
contract here was verbal and the evidence as to its exact nature
was conflicting. The court, impressed by the fact that the mantel-
pieces were ready-made and the fact that the cost of putting
them up was trifling as compared with the cost of the article
itself, held that the contract was one of sale. In Margin v. Jorgens2
the same question of the interpretation of a verbal contract arose.
Here the contract involved the installation of four Reems floor
heaters. The court held that the contract involved the labor and
skill of the plaintiff in cutting the floors, running pipes and other
works which placed in it the category of a construction contract
thereby denying the defendant his defense based on a redhibi-
tory vice.' In the case of Dugue v. Safety Oil Burners,4 the con-
tract involved the furnishing and installation of an oil burner.
The court held that the contract was one of sale and allowed the
owner to rescind on grounds of redhibitory defects. This case
was distinguished in Margin v. Jorgens& on the ground that the
oil burner was already attached to an existing hot air system,
thereby not requiring much labor or skill. The court also cautious-
ly pointed out that Article 2769 was not pleaded in this case.G
As the contracts for the furnishing and installation of floor
heaters, attic fans, small air-conditioning units, et cetera, are
usually verbal, the problem posed by these cases will no doubt
continue to confront the courts. The principle of weighing the
price of the article installed together with the cost and amount
of lab-or and skill involved seems to be the most reasonable way
1. 9 La. 434 (1836).
2. 24 So.(2d) 384 (La. App. 1946).
3. Art. 2520, La. Civil Code of 1870.
". 142 So. 161 (La. App. 1932).
5. 24 So.(2d) 384 (La. App. 1946).
G. Art. 2769, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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to ascertain the actual intention of the parties with regard to the
nature of the contract. The distinction, of course, is important for
the responsibilities imposed and the remedies offered by the ar-
ticles of this section are entirely different from those set forth in
the title "Of Sale."
In the case of Matthews v. Rudy,7 defendant agreed to build
a house on a lot owned by him in accordance with his own plans
and specifications. After completion of the house, the property
was to be transferred to the plaintiff for a price agreed upon for
the whole. Later the house began to deteriorate because of vices
and defects, and plaintiff brought suit under Article 2762.8 The
defendant contended that the contract was one of sale and plead-
ed one year prescription under Article 2534. The court held that
the agreement was in the nature of a construction contract, al-
though from the facts as given, it might have been viewed as a
sale with a suspensive condition. In view of the extensive build-
ing programs now being undertaken in which entire subdivisions
are raised under contracts similar to the one in this case, this
decision may be favorable to the eventual owners of houses con-
structed in this manner. The five and ten year warranty of good
workmanship under Article 2762 is a much more valuable right
than the right to sue for redhibitory defects within one year under
Article 2534.
The applicability of these -articles has also arisen in respect
to the prescriptive period of wages,9 tort responsibility of an in-
dependent contractor,' assertion of a vendor's privilege," the
right to rescind for failure of consideration,' 2 the distinction be-
tween the letting and hiring of services at so much per day and
the hiring of services for a job,1:3 and the difference between a sale
and the furnishing of materials by the job."4 It is also interesting
to note the astute attempt of counsel to avoid the applicability of
the articles in this section by basing the action on the rules for
quasi-contracts.'s
7. 4 La. App. 226 (1926).
8. Art. 2762, La. Civil Code of 1870.
9. State ex rel. Szarbary v. Recorder of Mortgages, 13 Orl. App. 292 (La.
App. 1916).
10. Plumb v. Hammong Lands, 130 So. 257 (La. App. 1930).
11. St. Mary Iron Works v. Community Manufacturing Enterprise, 119
So. 564 (La. App. 1924).
12. Johnson v. Cooil, 14 Ol. App. 40 (La. App. 1916).
13. Sumerall v. Wetherbee, 15 La. App. 234, 130 So. 875 (1930).
14. American Paint Works v. Metairie Ridge Nursery Co., 1 La. App.
396 (1925).
15. National Contracting Co. v. Sewerage & Water Board of N.O., 141
Fed. 325, 72 C.C.A. 473 (C.C.A. 5th, 1905).
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Destruction of Subject Matter Before Delivery
Articles 2758 through 2761 deal with the question of respon-
sibility for the destruction of the subject matter during perform-
ance of the construction contract and before delivery. Article 2758
lays down the rule for those cases where the undertaker furnishes
the materials for the work. It provides that "if the work be de-
stroyed, in whatever manner it may happen, previous to its being
delivered to the owner, the loss shall be sustained by the under-
taker, unless the proprietor be in default for receiving it, though
duly notified to do so."" (Italics supplied.)
Article 2759 is concerned with those cases where the under-
taker does not furnish the materials, but only his work or indus-
try, and in this case if destruction take place bdfore delivery "the
undertaker is only liable in case the loss has been occasioned by
his fault." These articles are based on the well-established pre-
cept of Res Periit Domino--that along with ownership goes its
ever-present attribute, the risk of loss. When the undertaker fur-
nishes the materials, he is theoretically considered the owner un-
til the work is completed and delivered and as such must bear
the loss in case of destruction. On the other hand, where the
proprietor furnishes the material and destruction occurs before
delivery, the responsibility for loss is borne by the proprietor, but
in this case "the undertaker shall not be entitled to his salaries,
unless the destruction be owing to the badness of the materials
used in the building."'17 The theory here is that the' undertaker is
in a sense the "owner" of his work and industry until the product
of such work and industry be delivered.
Article 2761 delves further into the idea of delivery, owner-
ship, and responsibility for loss by providing that
"If the work be composed of detached pieces, or made at
the rate of so much a measure, the parts may be delivered
separately; and that delivery shall be presumed to have-taken
place, if the proprietor has paid to the undertaker the price
due for the parts of the work which have already been com-
pleted."
It has been held that the term "work" as used in this article ap-
plies to the labor by which a thing is produced as well as the
16. Art. 2758, La. Civil Code of 1870.
17. Art. 2760, La. Civil Code of 1870,
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thing itself.' s In Dreyfus v. City of New Iberia' the contract
called for the construction of a sidewalk at so much per square
foot. The'court held that the work was one "made at the rate of
so much per measure" and upheld the contractor's demand for
payment for that part of the work already completed. This article
has made only a very slight appearance in Louisiana cases, but
it is nevertheless extremely important. It draws the distinction
between entire and divisible contracts ° about which there has
been a great deal of jurisprudence in the common law. 21 In Lou-
isiana, the distinction is important not only with regard to the
question of ownership and responsibility for loss but also as it
may relate to the rights, remedies and damages for non-perform-
ance of the entire contract.
Notice should be taken here of Articles 2063 and 206522 which
define and lay down the rules for conjunctive (divisible) con-
tracts. Article 2065 provides that where a sum is promised to be
paid in installments, a conjunctive obligation is created arid the
payment of the installments may be severally enforced. As the
construction of buildings is often an expensive undertaking,
necessity as well as convenience demands that the contract price
be paid in installments. These payments usually take the form
of what is known as progress payments, that is, as certain stages
of work are completed, corresponding installments become due
and payable. Although it is clear that the undertaker may de-
mand payment of the installments as the successive stages are
completed, does this also mean that ownership of the completed
stages passes to the proprietor when the installments are paid?
The only case found directly in point holds that the payment of
installments creates a presumption of delivery and that owner-
18. Levy & Son v. Paquette, 144 La. 344, 80 So. 269 (1918).
19. 150 La. 1020, 91 So. 439 (1922).
20. See Seguin v. Debon, 3 Mart. (O.S.) 6, .5 Am. Dec. 735 (La. 1813),
where this distinction was drawn.
21. See 9 Am. Jur. §§ 43-48, 59-67, for the extent and importance of this
distinction at common law.
22. Art. 2063, La. Civil Code of 1870: "A conjunctive obligation is one in
which the several objects in it are connected by a copulative, or in any other
manner which shows that all of them are severally comprised in the con-
tract. The contract creates as many different obligations as there are differ-
ent objects; and the debtor, when he wishes to discharge himself, may force
the creditor to receive them separately."
Art. 2065, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Where a sum is promised to be paid
at different instalments, a conjunctive obligation is created, and the pay-
ment may be severally paid or enforced, Rents, payable at fixed periods,
come also under this rule."
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ship (with its consequent risk of loss) is thereby transferred.23 It
is submitted, however, that Article 2761 is applicable only when
the subject matter of the contract is "composed of detached
pieces" or "made at the rate of so much a measure" and that own-
ership should not necessarily pass simply because the contract
calls for progress payments. A house or other building is not
normally composed of "detached pieces" in the sense of Article
2761, and to hold that ownership of the various stages passes as
the installments are paid is not consistent with the common prac-
tice of the procurement of Builders' Risk Insurance so as to satis-
fy the requirements of an insurable interest.
Under Article 2758, the phrase "in whatever manner it may
happen" does cast upon the undertaker a loss occasioned for un-
explained reasons, but the phrase does not hold the undertaker
liable for a loss due to faulty plans or specifications for which the
owner was solely responsible .2  In American Sheet Metal Works
v. Equitable Real Estate Company,2 5 plaintiff contracted to cover
defendant's passageway with a glass roof. The court held that it
was undue interference on the part of the defendant owner to
construct a brick wall while plaintiff was performing his work
and placed the responsibility of loss on the defendant owner. Also,
it has been held that the liability imposed by this article is not
a matter of public policy and may be assumed by the owner."
Duration and Extent of the Liability of Undertaker and Architect
After Completion
Article 2762 governs the duration and extent of the liability
of the undertaker and architect for the effects of bad workman-
ship after the building has been completed and delivered. This
article provides that
"If a building, which an architect or other workman has
undertaken to make by the job, should fall to ruin either in
whole or in part, on account of the badness of the workman-
ship, the architect or undertaker shall bear the loss if the
building falls to ruin in the course of ten years, if it be a stone
or brick building, and of five years if it be built in wood or
with frames filled with bricks."
23. Industrial Homestead Ass'n v. Junker, Docket No. 7402, Orleans Ap-
peal, Teissier's Digest of the Unreported Decisions of the Court of Appeal
(1923) 35.
24. Penn Bridge Co. v. New Orleans, 222 Fed. 737 (C.C.A. 5th, 1915).
25. 12 Orl. App. 111 (La. App. 1914).
26. Tatum v. Andrews, 165 La. 222, 115 So, 466 (1928).
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"Badness of workmanship" as used in this article includes
badness of materials even though furnished by the owner, for it
is the duty of the undertaker to reject them if they are unfit. 7 To
hold the undertaker liable, the owner must show by a clear pre-
ponderance of evidence that the ruin was due to badness of work-
manship or defective materials and not to defects in the soilP8 or
to faulty plans or specifications" for which the architect would be
responsible. Neither the architect nor the undertaker, however,
is responsible for ruin caused by the defects in the soil"° or the re-
fusal of the owner to have the excavation in the soil properly
prepared for the building.3
Article 2762 refers to all latent defects which may cause ruin
in part or in whole and acceptance and occupancy does not waive
the owner's right to recover for damages due to such defects 3" as
the owner could not with reasonable diligence have discovered
them. The owner, however, must not delay unreasonably in com-
plaining of such defects when to do so would increase the burden
of the undertaker.'3
The word "building" as used in Articles 2762 and 3545 would
seem to apply only to houses, barns, garages and similar struc-
tures. In Federal Land Bank of New Orleans v. Lococo,"3 the
court indicated that a derrick would fall within its application,
from which it may be argued that towers, tanks, cisterns, bridges,
et cetera should likewise be affected. But when these other struc-
tures are included, a question of prescription may arise, for the
articles lay down prescriptive periods for wood, stone or brick
buildings only.
In the case of Schott v. Ingargolia"' the question arose as to
the tort liability of the contractor for injuries sustained by a third
person when a building collapsed. The defendant contractor filed
an exception of no cause of action. The court held that, admitting
that the collapse was directly occasioned by the contractor's un-
27. Delee v. Hatcher, 19 La. Ann. 98 (1867).
28. Fremont v. Harris, 9 Rob. 23 (La. 1844).
29. Police Jury of Parish of Vernon v. Johnson, 111 La. 279, 35 So. 550
(1903).
30. Fremont v. Harris, 9 Rob. 23 (La. 1844). See also Art. 1793, French
Civil Code, which makes the undertaker liable for ruin caused by defects
in the soil.
31. Powell v. "Markham, 18 La. Ann. 581 (1866).
32. Levy v. M. Schwartz and Bro. and Win. Golding, 34 La. Ann. 209
(1882); Ascano v. Macaluso, 120 So. 506 (La. App. 1930).
33. Corley v. Hill, Harris & Co., Inc., 8 La. App. 693 (1928).
34. 178 So. 192 (La. App. 1938).
35. 180 So. 462 (La. App. 1938).
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skillful and defective workmanship, he would still not be liable to
a third person who is injured by the fall of the building. The
court was of the opinion that, if the contractor owed the duty to
protect all third persons against hidden defects, it would be diffi-
cult to measure the extent of his responsibility, and no prudent
man would then engage in such occupations. When the under-
taker furnishes the material, however, he is the owner of the
building until delivery and as such is liable in tort under Articles
670 and 2322.86 The question still remains as to the extent of his
liability to the owner under Article 2762. Is it limited merely to
damages arising out of the contract such as the owner may collect
for the repair of his building, or does it also extend to personal
injuries? The courts heretofore have had no occasion to delve
generally into the nature and extent of the undertaker's liability
under this article. However, in view of the large building pro-
grams of today with their use of experimental methods and ma-
terials, the problem of the extent of the undertaker's liability un-
der this article may soon confront the courts. By analogy from
the interpretation placed on Article 2695 governing the lessor's
liability to the lessee for the condition of the leased premises,"7
a suggested answer is that Article 2762 will apply only as between
the owner and undertaker, but that the owner's right to recover
will be extended to include damages for personal injuries in
addition to damages for repair of his building.
Rules Governing the Payment for Extra Work
Articles 2763 and 2764 lay down the general rules governing
the payments for extra work, that is, work in addition to that
agreed upon because of changes in the original plot, plans, or
specifications. Article 2763 denies the undertaker any recovery
unless he can prove that the changes necessitating the extra
work "have been made in compliance with the wishes of the
owner." Article 276488 makes an exception to this rule "...where
the alteration or increase is so great, that it can not be supposed
to have been made without the knowledge of the owner.." and
also "where the alteration or increase was necessary and has not
been foreseen." Under these articles the consent or knowledge of
the owner does not necessarily have to be express. It may be
36. Mahon v. Spence, 11 La. App. 604 (1929).
37. Art. 2695, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The lessor guarantees the lessee
against all the vices and defects of the thing, . . . and if any loss should
result to the lessee from the vices and defects, the lessor shall be bound to
indemnify him for the same."
38. Art. 2763, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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implied when the owner is present at the construction, witnesses
the performance of the extra work, and makes no objection there-
to.30 Also when the owner furnishes the materials, a presumption
is raised that the change in plans was made with his consent.4"
Custom or usage plays an important role in the determination
of what is extra work. Thus custom was relied upon to determine
what amount of plastering was called for by the contract and
what amount was extra,41 whether "putting in hangers" was extra
and also what unexplained dotted or broken lines meant in the
plans.42 It is also now understood that when work is called for
either by the plans or specifications, though not in both, the work
is part of the contract and cannot be deemed "extra. '4 3
Difficulty in interpreting these articles arises when they have
to be construed with certain stipulations in the construction
contract itself. The most troublesome is the clause often in-
serted in building contracts to the effect that no recovery for
extra Work shall be allowed unless such work bears the written
authorization of the owner. Several cases 4 have interpreted such
a stipulation to mean that the existence of a written authorization
is a condition precedent to the undertaker's right to recover for
"extras"; that, in the absence of clear and convincing proof,
such a stipulation has been waived, parol evidence is inadmissible
to prove such "extras" even though the alteration was so great
that it could not be supposed to have been made without the
knowledge of the owner or even if the alteration or increase was
necessary and could not be foreseen. These cases are based on the
theory that the contract is the law as between the parties. Other
cases oppose this doctrine and hold that the undertaker may re-
cover for extra work despite such a stipulation in the contract.
Thus in the following situations parol evidence was admitted and
recovery was allowed: (1) where it was shown that the altera-
tion was so great that it could not have- escaped the owner's
39. Doyle v. Ryan, 9 Rob. 402 (La. 1845); Mathias v. Lebret, 10 Rob. 94
(La. 1845). See also Art. 1816, La. Civil Code of 1870.
40. Andrews v. Jacobs, 4 La. 101 (1832).
41. Fritz Jahncke, Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 166 La.
593, 117 So. 729 (1928).
42. E. W. Ullrich Glass Co., Inc. v. Interstate Electric Co., 171 La. 836,
132 So. 363 (1931).
43. Delaney v. John 0. Chisolm and Co., 166 La. 406, 117 So. 443 (1928).
See also E. W. Ullrich Glass Co., Inc. v. Interstate Electric Co., 171 La. 836,
132 So. 363 (1931).
44. Monarch v. Board of Com'rs of McDonough School Fund of City of
New Orleans, 49 La. Ann. 991, 22 So. 259 (1897); Ault & Burden v. Shephard,
8 La. App. 595 (1928); French Market Homestead Ass'n v. Usner, 170 La.
783, 129 So. 446 (1930).
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knowledge; 45 (2) where the owner was present at the work, saw
the additions and made no objections thereto;4 6 (3) where a sub-
sequent verbal agreement was entered into abrogating the writ-
ten contract.
4 1
Groner v. Cavendere gives an excellent summation of the
conflicting cases on this point and concludes that the better rea-
sons are on the side of admitting parol and allowing recovery in
cases where the owner must have had knowledge of the changes
because of his presence or because of the great extent of the
changes, and also in cases where the increase was necessary and
has not been foreseen. The principles underlying the decision in
this case are waiver and prevention of unjust enrichment which
seems also to be the basis of Article 2764. It is to be noted here
that extra work, as defined by Article 2763, means additional
work brought about by changes in the original plans and specifi-
cations and not (as might be indicated by Article 2764) the in-
creased cost of the work originally planned because of undue
hardships encountered. The distinction may be illustrated in the
following manner: Suppose the plans and specifications call for
concrete foundations of a ten foot depth. If the soil is unduly soft
and soggy, foundations of a twenty foot depth may be required.
This would result in a change of plans and hence extra work. But
if the soil is unusually hard and rocky, the laying of the ten foot
foundations according to plans and specifications may involve un-
due and unforeseen expense, but will not constitute extra work.
Another stipulation often used in building contracts is to
the effect that no additional compensation will be allowed if un-
usual difficulties necessitating change of plans are encountered in
the execution of any part of the work. This clause is particularly
favorable to proprietors in view of Article 2764 and it has been
held that such a stipulation denies the contractor whatever rights
he would have under this article1 9
Death of Undertaker as an Excuse for Non-Performance
Article 2766 provides that
"Contracts for hiring out work are canceled by the death
45. Peterson v. Peralta, 3 La. App. 516 (1926).
46. Wellman v. Smith, 114 La. 228, 38 So. 151 (1905); Hinricks v. Edmonds
Realty & Ins. Co., Orleans Appeals, Teissier's Digest of the Unreported De-
cisions of the Court of Appeal (1923) 36, 38.
47. Harvey v. Mouncou, 3 La. App. 231 (1925).
48. 16 La. App. 565 (1931).
49. O'Leary v. Board of Port Com'rs for Port of New Orleans, 150 La.
649, 91 So. 139 (1921).
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of the workman, architect or undertaker, unless the proprietor
should consent that the work should be continued by the heir
or heirs of the architect, or by workmen employed for that
purpose by the heirs."
This article is based on the presumption that the undertaker will
personally perform the work and that his skill is especially called
for)" The right of cancellation provided for seems to run only in
favor of the owner and the heirs or personal representatives of
the undertaker are bound under the terms of the contract if the
owner wishes its continuance. The death of the owner does not
affect the contract and it continues in full force.
In McCord v. The West Feliciana Railroad Company,," where
the contractors were members of a partnership, the court held
that the death of one of the partners canceled the contract as the
owner refused to consent to its completion by the other. The
undertaker was allowed compensation for the value of the work
done and the materials prepared. The application of Article 2766
in this case proved to be somewhat harsh, for the remaining part-
ner was ready, willing and able to complete the contract, and had
set up an extensive outlay of machinery, including a steam saw-
mill, especially for the purpose of providing lumber for the under-
taking.
Insofar as a great number of building contracts are primarily
based not on the honesty or skill of the contractor, but rather on
the fact that the contractor was the lowest bidder, Article 2766
should be restricted to those cases where the undertaker personal-
ly does the work or where it is shown that the skill, honesty or
other personal quality of the undertaker was particularly relied
upon. Construction today is often undertaken by many large con-
tracting firms and partnerships, and Article 2766 should not be
50. Planiol et Ripert, in commenting on the cQunterpart of this article in
the French Civil Code, state:
"La personnalit6 du maitre est indiffrente au contrat: sa mort n'y met
donc pas fin. Ses obligations seront ex~cut4es par ses hdritiers, encore que
le travail command6 no soit pas de leur gofit. Au contraire, lart. 1795 decide
que la mort de lentrepreneur met fin au contrat. L'entreprtse suppose une
activit6 particuli6re chez l'entrepreneur, et quelquefois des talents person-
nels. Ses hdritiers n'auront pas ndcessairement les mnmes dons, ils n'execre-
ront pas ndcessairement la mme profession. Ces considdrations ont conduit
le lIgislateur btposer une r~gle gdnrale, non seulement pour le cas ou le
contrat a W fait intuitu personae, mais pour tous los cas d'entreprise, con-
trairement a lancien droit qui ne considrait pas le contrat comme rompu
lorsqu6 le travail peut 6tre accompli par n'importe qui. Cette regle n'a
d'ailleurs aucun caractere d'ordere public et les parties peuvent y droger
dans le contrat." 11 Planiol et Ripert, Traite Pratique de Droit Civil
Francais (ed. 1932) 183, n* 936.
51. 3 La. Ann. 285 (1848).
[Vol. VII
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taken literally, but rather in connection with its historical back-
ground.
The "value of the work" referred to in Article 276712 has
been interpreted to mean the relative or contractual value as
opposed to the real or actual value." Thus if the contract was
one-half complete upon the death of the undertaker, his heirs
would be allowed one-half of the contract price even though this
amount might be considerably greater or much less than the ac-
tual value of the work. In short, the heirs either benefit by their
ancestor's prudent bargaining, or suffer because of his improvi-
dence.
Liability of Owner for Non-Perormance
The liability of the owner for non-performance of the con-
tract on his part is governed by Article 2765 which provides that
"The proprietor has a right to cancel at pleasure the bar-
gain he has made, even in case the work has already been
commenced, by paying the undertaker for the expense and
labor already incurred, and such damages as the nature of
the case may require."
This article, because of its seemingly anomalous character,
has been the subject of much comment from the very early cases
down to the present day." In order to understand best the sig-
nificance and application of this article, it is necessary at the out-
set to distinguish between those cases where the owner cancels
at his pleasure or for insufficient cause and those where the owner
cancels the contract for sufficient cause independent of Article
2765.55
When the owner cancels at his pleasure by virtue of the
"right" (or privilege) granted under Article 2765, his liability is
determined by the penalty set forth in that article. Thus he is
liable for the value of the "expense and labor already incurred"
and for "such damages as the nature of the case may require."
The phrase "expense and labor already incurred" has reference
52. Art. 2767, La. Civil Code of 1870.
53. Thomas v. L'Hote, 22 La. Ann. 73 (1870).
54. Dufour v. Janin, 8 La. 147 (1835); Forrest & Crocker v. Caldwell &
Hickey, 5 La. Ann. 220 (1850); Monarch v. Board of Com'rs of McDonough
School Fund of City of New Orleans, 49 La. Ann. 991, 22 So. 259 (1897);
Glassel, Taylor & Robinson v. John W. Harris Associates, 209 La. 957, 26
So.(2d) 1 (1946).
55. Wickliffe v. Cooper & Sperrier, 167 La. 689, 120 So. 52 (1929); Pitt-
man v. Bourgeois, 152 So. 765 (La. App. 1934); Vazquez v. Gairens, 26 So.(2d)
319 (La. App. 1946).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. VII
to the "actual" as opposed to the "contractual" value of work done
and the materials furnished at the time of cancellation.," The
contract ceases to be the sole standard by which the value of the
work and labor is to be determined, 7 but it does have some
weight in the determination of this value. 8 The phrase "such
damages as the nature of the case may require" has invariably
been interpreted to include the "loss of profits" because of the
cancellation."' The contractor or architect, however, bears the
burden of showing what his profits would have been."0 It should
be emphasized that even though the owner arbitrarily cancels
the contract for insufficient cause, he does so by exercising a legal
right given to him by Article 2765. Thus he is not at fault, or
guilty of breach, or in bad faith. Even though the cancellation
was made to further or protect his own interest, he should not be
held responsible for damages for non-performance, on the basis
of bad faith.6 '
Whether or not the owner has sufficient cause for cancelling
the contract depends upon the materiality of the undertaker's
failure to perform. Whether a failure to perform in certain re-
spects is material or not is a question of degree depending largely
upon general principles '2 and the facts of each case. However,
56. Joublanc v. Daunoy, 6 La. 656 (1834); Dufour v. Janin, 8 La. 147
(1835); Dugue v. Levy, 114 La. 21, 37 So. 995 (1904).
57. Villalobos v. Mooney, 2 La. 331 (1831); Hanema-un v. Eberle, 1 La.
App. 21 (1924).
58. Foster v. Kokernot, 5 La. 260 (1833).
59. Forrest & Crocker v. Caldwell & Iickey, 5 La. Ann. 220 (1850); Dugue
v. Levy, 114 La. 21, 37 So. 995 (1904); Wickliffe v. Sperrier, 167 La. 689, 120
So. 52 (1929); Pittman v. Bourgeois, 152-So. 765 (La. App. 1934).
60. Moore v. Howard, 18 La. Ann. 635 (1866).
61. Dugue v. Levy, 114 La. 21, 37 So. 995 (1904); Cusachs & Co. v. Sew-
erage & Water Board of New Orleans, 116 La. 510, 40 So. 855 (1906). See also
Art. 1934(2), La. Civil Code of 1870.
62. A.L.I., Restatement of Contracts, § 275, contains an excellent sum-
mation of these principles. It reads:
"In determining the materiality of a failure fully to perform a promise
the following circumstances are influential:
"(a) The extent to which the injured party will obtain the substantial bene-
fit which he could have reasonably anticipated;
"(b) The extent to which the injured party may be adequately compen-
sated in damages for lack of complete performance;
"(c) The extent to which the party failing to perform has already partly
performed or made preparations for performance;
"(d) The greater or less hardship on the party failing to perform in ter-
mpinating the contract;
"(e) The willful, negligent or innocent behavior of the party failing to
perform;
"(f) The greater or less uncertainty that the party failing to perform
will perform the remainder of the contract."
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when the court decides that non-performance of a building con-
tract is material, the breach will be considered active"5 and a
putting in default will not be necessary. When the owner cancels
for sufficient cause, Article 2765 ceases to be the standard of the
owner's liability and the undertaker may not recover for loss of
profits.04 The owner is liable for the value of the work done and
materials furnished only if they inure to his benefit.
Liability of the Undertaker
Article 2769 governs the undeftaker's liability when he fails
to perform in accordance with the contract. It provides that
"If an undertaker fails to do the work he has contracted
to do, or if he does not execute it in the manner and at the
time he has agreed to do it, he shall be liable in damages for
the losses that may ensue from his noncompliance with his
contract."
This article must be construed with the now well-settled doc-
trine of substantial performance. Substantial performance is said
to exist when there has been no omission in the essential ele-
ments of the contract, but when the strict letter of the agreement
has not been carried out because of slight deviations or because
of technical, unimportant, or inadvertent defects or omissions., '
The doctrine as applied in the majority of cases 6 is to the effect
that when the undertaker has substantially performed, he may
sue for the recovery of the entire contract price. The owner in
order to escape the payment of part or all of the contract price
bears the burden of proving the damages caused him by the de-
fects and omission. Because of the language used in this line of
cases, it would seem at first glance that the burden of proof is on
the proprietor to show damages that he has incurred because of
the defects and omissions even in cases where the contractor has
not substantially performed., However, a closer inspection will
63. Hill & Markam v. Penny, 15 La. Ann. 212 (1860); Sarrazin v. Adams,
110 La. 124, 34 So. 301 (1902); Parkerson v. Home Protection Service, 24
So.(2d) 256 (La,. App. 1945); Vazquez v. Gairens, 26 So.(2d) 319 (La. App.
1946).
64. Peterson v. Sutter, 4 La. App. 180 (1926).
65. Mitchell v. Holomon, 10 La. App. 219, 120 So. 672 (1929).
- 66. Cairy v. Randolph, 6 La. Ann. 202 (1851); Davidson v. McGrath, 5
La. App. 125 (1926); Reimann Const. Co. v. Upton, 178 So. 528 (La. App.
1938); Lillis v. Anderson, 21 So.(2d) 389 (La. App. 1945).
67. A. M. Blodgett Const. Co. v. Cheney Lumber Co., 129 La. 1057, 57 So.
369 (1912); Boane v. Hardin, 15 La. App. 286 (1930); Merrill v. Harang, 198
So. 386 (La. App. '1940); Lillis v. Anderson, 21 So.(2d) 389 (La. App. 1945).




reveal the distinction between cases where the undertaker has
substantially performed and those where he has not.
Thus in cases where the undertaker has not substantially per-
formed, he may still recover for the value of his work and ma-
terials which have inured to the benefit of the owner.*"5 Recovery
is allowed on the theory that the owner should not be unjustly
enriched at the expense of the contractor. This is the case even
though the undertaker may have "willfully" abandoned the con-
tract,7" the theory being that the principle of unjust enrichment
outweighs the general rule that the wilful violator is entitled to
no relief. On the other hand, when the unfinished work is of no
benefit to the owner, the undertaker will be denied recovery for
his work and material. 1
The determination of the specific amount of damages to be
paid because of breach by the undertaker is a problem of some
magnitude. It has been shown in the discussion of Article 2765
that when the owner cancels the contract for insufficient cause,
the undertaker is entitled to the profits he would have made had
he been allowed to complete the contract. In American Surety
Company of New York v. Woods 2 the argument was advanced
that since the contractor (when the owner is guilty of breach)
may recover the profits he would have made by showing that the
cost of completing the contract is less than the contract price,
then the owner (when the contractor is guilty of breach) should
likewise recover when the cost of completing the contract would
be more than the contract price. In this case the undertaker
agreed to construct the sewers for $739,000 but, realizing that he
would lose money on the contract, cancelled it. It would have
cost the owner $912,000 to complete the contract. The receiver of
the sewerage company, without having the work completed,
claimed as damages the differences between the contract price
and the cost of completion. The court disallowed plaintiff's claim
holding that when the contractor defaults, the owner has the
power to complete the contract himself or to have others do so,
but when the owner breaches, the contractor does not have this
power. The court also remarked that the owner's loss would be
69. Etle v. Sparks, 4 La. 463 (1832); Allen v. Wills, 4 La. Ann. 97 (1849);
Taylor v. Almand, 50 La. Ann. 351, 23 So. 365 (1897); Babst v. Peritz, Orleans
Appeals, Docket No. 7458, Teissier's Digest of the Unreported Decisions of
the Court of Appeal (1923) 36; Peterson v. Sutter, 4 La. App. 180 (1926).
70. Peterson v. Sutter, 4 La. 180 (1832); Slack v. Standard Chevrolet
Co., 197 So. 200 (La. App. 1940).
71. Mitchell v. Holomon, 10 La. App. 219, 120 So. 672 (1929).
72. 105 Fed. 741 (C.C.A. 5th, 1901).
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certain only in the event that he had the work done at a cos:
greater than the contract price. The holding in this case was to
the effect that when the contractor defaults, the right of the
owner to sue for damages is not absolutely dependent upon his
completion of the abandoned work, but the damages to which he
is then entitled will not include the sum that the contractor
would have lost had he complied with the agreement. 73
In the case of Fite v. Miller,7 4 the defendant was obligated
to drill an oil well but refused to do so. Plaintiff sued to recover
the cost of drilling the well as damages. The evidence showed
that the chances of striking oil by drilling the well were extreme-
ly remote. Plaintiff was allowed to recover the cost of drill-
ing the well even though he had taken no steps to have it drilled
by others. The opinion of the court on final hearing was appar-
ently based on the theory that when one party breaches a con-
tract, the proper measure of damages is the difference between
the market value of the act contracted for and the contract price.
The court therefore found that the injured party was entitled to
damages despite the fact that he had taken no steps to have the
act performed by others and despite the showing that the act
when performed would have been of no benefit to him. However,
the court was doubtlessly impressed by the fact that the breach
by the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a hope and that such
hope was plaintiff's sole benefit under the contract whereas the
defendant had received the full performance that the plaintiff
had contracted to give him. The above cases present divergent
views in regard to the extent of the undertaker's liability for a
total or material breach. But note, however, that when the con-
tract has been substantially performed and the owner is seeking
reduction of the contract price, credit will be allowed when the
owner shows with sufficient certainty77 the damages occasioned
by the defects and omissions in the undertaker's work.
Note on the Remaining Articles in This Section
Article 276871 makes the undertaker responsible for the acts
73. But see Leinbard v. Meyer, 11 La. App. 328 (1929), where the holding
in this case was apparently ignored.
74. 196 La. 876,200 So. 285 (1940).
75. 105 Fed. 741 (C.C.A. 5th, 1901).
76. Golston v. Bartlett, 112 S.W.(2d) 1077 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
77. See note 67, supra.
78. Cairy v. Randolph, 6 La. Ann. 202 (1851); Davidson v. McGrath, 5
La. App. 125 (1926); Merril v. Harang, 198 So. 386 (La. App. 1940).
7U. Art. 2768, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The undertaker is responsible for
the acts of the persons employed by him."
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of the persons employed by him. This article presents an agency
problem, that is, master, servant, independent contractor relation-
ship and is conditioned by the principles of agency governing this
relationship.
Articles 2770 and 2772-2777 are concerned with the liens of
workmen, materialmen, et cetera. These articles have largely
been supplanted by-statutory material and the subject is beyond
the province of the present comment.80
WALKER P. MCMURDO
DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES AND THE
SHRINKING DOLLAR
-In 1878 a New York appellate court said, "the counsel for
each side has cited numerous cases. But in making comparisons
of other cases with the present, we notice two things: one is
that the relative value of money has diminished in recent times;
another is that, generally, in the older parts of the country the
relative value of money is less than in the new."'
Since that time this idea has become well recognized and
similar expressions have appeared in numerous cases.2 The effect
to be given the fluctuating value of the dollar, however, cannot
be expressed in terms of a definite rule. It is only one of a large
number of factors to be considered in the determination of the
award, many of which can at best be merely approximated.
During and after World War I the purchasing power of the
dollar declined rapidly with the consequent increase in the cost
of living.' It was during this period that the consideration of the
present and relative purchasing power of the dollar by the triers
of facts, as a factor in the determination of awards in personal
80. This material is treated In detail in Daggett, Louisiana Privileges
and Chattel Mortgage (1942) 217 et seq., 62 et seg.
1. Gayle v. New York Central and H. R. R. Co., 13 Hun 1, 4 (N. Y. 1878).
2. The following cases are merely representative: Doyle v. New Orleans
Ry. & Light Company, 121 La. 945, 46 So. 929, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 632 (1908);
Rogers v. Hiram J. Allen Lumber Co., Ltd., 129 La. 900, 57 So. 166, 39 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 202, 15 Am. Jur. 621 (1912); Stromer v. Dupont, 150 So. 32 (La. App.
1933); Brown v. Homer-Doyline Bus Lines, 23 So. (2d) 348 (La. App. 1945);
Illinois Central R. Co. v. Johnson, 205 Ala.1, 87 So. 866 (1920); Estrada v.
Orwitz, 170 P. (2d) 43 (Cal. App. 19461; Posch v. Chicago Railways Co., 221
Ill. App. 241 (1921); Johnson v. St. Paul City R. Co., 67 Minn. 260, 69 N.W.
900, 36 L.R.A. 586 (1897); Hurst v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 280 Mo. 566, 219
S.W. 566, 10 A.L.R. 174 (1920). But cf. Canfleld v. Chicago R.I. & P. Ry., 142
Iowa 658, 121 NW. 186 (1909); Hodkinson v. Parker, 16 N.W. (2d) 924 (S.D.
1944).
3. See table, note 22 infra.
4. The expression "triers of fact" is used to include either the trial judge
or the jury, or both, as the case may be.
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